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 Ákos Aczél   Dániel Homolya 
Our paper explores the risks that arise due to indebtedness of Hungarian local governments. 
Our analysis relies on interviews conducted with the heads of the local government business 
branches of the credit institutions most important in terms of local government financing and on 
the related data collections, as well as on data from the Hungarian State Treasury regarding the 
financial management of local governments and on data from banks. Until 2011, the repayment 
of the bonds issued during the bond issue boom experienced in the local government sector in 
2007–2008 started only in the case of one third of the bonds outstanding. However, by the end of 
2011 year nearly 50 per cent and by end-2013 90 per cent of total bonds outstanding will reach 
the principal repayment period. Due to the considerable foreign exchange exposure of total 
loans and bonds outstanding (60 per cent, 80 per cent of which is Swiss franc exposure) as well 
as to the declining revenues of local governments and the deteriorating economic prospects, it is 
doubtful that local governments will be able to repay their debts to the banking sector in line 
with the original maturities. Therefore local governments financing may have an effect not only 
on the fiscal position but on the whole financial system as well. Nevertheless, our partial 
analysis establishes that the risks related to the debt of the local government sector have 
increased significantly in the recent period, but these risks could be managed by the banks. The 
comprehensive restructuring of the local government system as a whole and a further changing 
of debt settlement procedures by the government may influence the financial position of the 
local government system. In parallel with the regrouping of tasks, transferring of a portion of 
local government debt (primarily from the county local governments) to the central budget may 
result in a clear picture. 
Keywords: banks, state and local borrowing, bankruptcy, liquidation 
1. Indebtedness of local governments 
During 2007 and 2008, the liabilities of local governments to the banking sector approximately 
doubled. Total exposures of the banking sector have not increased significantly since end-2008. At 
end-June 2011, total bonds and total loans outstanding amounted to HUF 550 billion and HUF 450 
billion, respectively. Foreign exchange exposure within the accumulated total loans and bonds 
outstanding is significant (approximately 60%), 80% of which is Swiss franc denominated. The 
increase in total liabilities outstanding was driven by both supply and demand factors. It is important 
to emphasise that this article basically analyses the risks to the banking sector; therefore, it does not 
contain a thorough examination of the risks that surround other debts (mainly commercial credit) of 
local governments, which have been fluctuating around HUF 200 billion for years. 
                                                     
*
 Earlier version of this paper was published in October 2011 Issue of MNB Bulletin. 
(http://english.mnb.hu/Kiadvanyok/mnben_mnbszemle/mnben_mnb-bulletin-october-2011). This paper contains 
the views of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
(central bank of Hungary). Many pieces of news have arisen in connection with the restructuring of the local 
government system since mid-2011; this article is based on information that became known until end-August 
2011. However we made some preliminary comments on the changes executed at the end of 2011 regarding 
regulation of local governments. Responsibility for any mistakes lies with the authors alone. 
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In addition to cross-selling opportunities (EU applications, counselling, payment services etc.), banks’ 
increasing supply experienced in the local government segment may have been fed by the approach 
built upon the continuous operation of local governments, which is typical among creditors: resulting 
from their tasks declared by law, local governments may not become completely insolvent, and total 
dissolution may not take place either, as they are obliged to ensure the performance of certain basic 
tasks, and the related revenues may cover repayments as well. There is some kind of concentratedness 
on the supply side, as the 7 banks that are the most active in local government financing have a market 
share of approximately 97 per cent.  
The demand of local governments strengthened due to three main factors. Firstly, the support 
programmes announced by the European Union basically require own funds and many of them 
provide the awarded funding only after the completion of the given project; therefore, it may have 
become necessary for applicants to advance the funds. Secondly, precautionary considerations 
stemming from the regulatory uncertainty may also have played a role in the considerable magnitude 
of indebtedness. As a result of the bills1 pointing to restrictions in lending to local governments, as a 
kind of last opportunity – presumably in order to accumulate reserves – local governments expanded 
their resources even in economic situations when concrete investment objectives were not yet 
specified. The hypotheses of preparing for applications and of accumulating reserves in advance are 
confirmed by the fact that at system level the amount of deposits built up following the issue of bonds 
did not change for years, and the operating costs and accumulation expenditures of local governments 
did not increase until end-2009, i.e. the resources were not used for several years. Moreover, foreign 
exchange funds were available at a favourable price, which may provide an interest advantage 
attainable over the entire maturity, and allows, until the spending of the funds, the realisation of the 
difference between the interests to be paid after the foreign exchange loans and the interests received 
for the forint deposits. 
As Homolya and Szigel (2008) analysed Hungarian regulatory limits to obtaining financing by the 
local governments were not effective, the realised local government financing was determined by 
interaction of supply and demand limited by risk management concepts of banks. As it is refered in 
Homolya and Szigel (2008) (p. 24.). The literature (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997) distinguishes four 
fundamental systems in the regulation of local government indebtedness: market discipline, direct 
controls by the centralgovernment; rules-based approaches; co-operative approach (decision of local 
governments in agreement with a central authority). Theoretically, from among these alternative 
methods the Hungarian system was rule-based before 2012, as the relevant act determined an annual 
maximum debt service for local governments, this regulation is that the annual liabilities undertaken 
by local governments (including all financing costs, primarily loan repayment, debiting the particular 
year) may not exceed 70% of their own proprietary revenues minus short-term liabilities. However 
this rule was incapable of limitation because of not reach of this preset limit by almost any local 
government, uncertainties about future compliance with these limits, and no predefined penalty for 
exceeding the borrowing limit. Thus the Hungarian system was a quasi market controlled system, 
however the control power of market players was limited by intransparency of financial positions of 
individual local governments (see Homolya and Szigel (2008) for more details). It is worh mentioning, 
that issue of limiting indebtedness of local governments is not only Hungarian specific question, in the 
last couple of years in case of different countries concerns about subgovernmental level public debt 
have been emerged (e.g. autonomous communities/ provinces in case of Spain, some states in the 
                                                     
1
 In November 2007, the Ministry of Finance prepared a proposal for amending the Act on Local Governments 
aiming at, inter alia, changing the existing borrowing limit. (The content of the proposal is outlined in Vigvári, 
2007). 
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US).As the funds – mostly originating from bond issues – were placed as (forint based) bank deposits, 
the position of the sector vis-à-vis the banking sector deteriorated only slightly until end-2009, i.e. 
until local governments started to reduce their deposits. However, in the period between early 2010 
and the publication of this article, net accounts receivable of the banking sector vis-à-vis the local 
government sector increased by HUF 444 billion (Chart 1). The worsening of the position is 
attributable to three main processes. The withdrawal of deposits was typical on the asset side of local 
governments. The decline in total deposits by around HUF 220 billion moved together with the 
increase in expenditures with an accumulation purpose (accumulation expenditures that are 
presumably related to EU applications increased from HUF 574 billion in 2009 to HUF 721 billion in 
2010). In addition, operating costs also exceeded the 2009 level by some HUF 84 billion in 2010. 
Chart 1: Position of the local government sector vis-à-vis the domestic banking sector 
 
Source: MNB data. 
On the liability side of local governments – in parallel with the stagnation of long-term loans – the 
surge in overdraft credit impaired the position of the sector vis-à-vis the banking sector. Since January 
2010, the total overdraft credit to local governments has nearly doubled, increasing from HUF 62 
billion to HUF 116 billion. Local governments may have been encouraged to increase the amount of 
overdraft credit by the fact that – similarly to bond issues – using this form of loan does not require a 
public procurement procedure, as this loan is available as part of the payment service. On the other 
hand, the increase in short-term loans outstanding also indicates strengthening liquidity problems, 
which may stem from the stretched financial management of local governments. The developments in 
depositing and borrowing are also reflected in the fact that in 2010, in parallel with a slight increase in 
outstanding debt, the cash-flow based deficit of local governments grew considerably.  
The weakening of the forint against the Swiss franc also resulted in the worsening of the net position. 
Due to the change in the exchange rate, accounts payable of the sector to the banking sector increased 
by some HUF 110 billion since 2010 Q1, which calls attention to the significant exchange rate risk 
surrounding the outstanding debt.  
In addition to the aforementioned exchange rate risk, other default risks are also related to the 
accumulated debt stock. It carries an uncertainty whether local governments are able to produce the 
costs of their investment implemented, i.e. own funds for the application and the interest cost to be 
Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States  
 
160 
paid in the case of subsequent financing. It indicates a slight development of efficiency that the 
participants of the sector spent nearly three quarters of the investment on real estate purchases and 
barely one fifth on real property renewal, i.e. operating costs may presumably decline only to a lesser 
extent. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the budgets of local governments were well-
founded and based on forward-looking financial planning for a longer period of time as well. As the 
repayment of the principal part of the bonds issued usually has to be started only 3–4 years following 
the issue, short-term objectives may have overwritten the aspects of prudent financial planning. An 
indication of this is that while in 2006 the liabilities of only thirty-three of the largest five hundred 
local governments that have own revenues exceeded their own revenues, the number of such local 
governments already reached one hundred and twenty-three in 2010 (Chart 2). The increase in 
liabilities played a more essential role in the worsening of the liabilities-to-own revenues indicator 
observed in recent years than the decline in own revenues. 
Chart 2: Changes in liabilities to own revenues of the five hundred largest local governments 
that have revenues of their own between 2006 and 2010 
 
Sources: Hungarian State Treasury, the authors’ own calculations. 
For the sake of a complete analysis, on the basis of the data of the Hungarian State Treasury we also 
reviewed the profit and loss accounts, balance sheet statements and other reports of local governments. 
Individual level examinations reveal that indebtedness is strongly concentrated among larger local 
governments. The breakdown according to types of settlements shows that 23 per cent of the total debt 
accumulated at the municipality of the capital and at the districts of the capital. Their financial 
situation may be considered relatively stable; based on our data, these local governments have enough 
room for manoeuvre to afford the instalments due. The examination of the revenues (apart from the 
revenues related to securities and borrowing) and the basic expenditures (operating costs including the 
repayment burden due) of local governments reveals that basic expenditures exceed 70 per cent of 
revenues only in the case of one tenth of the capital and district municipalities.2 Local governments of 
counties and small settlements are in the most stretched situation: in the case of both types, the ratio of 
local governments (value weighted with expenditures) where basic expenditures exceed 70 per cent of 
their revenues is significant, 60–80 per cent (Chart 3). Moreover, among the villages, around 23 per 
cent of the settlements (value weighted with expenditures) exceed the 100 per cent basic 
                                                     
2
 Value weighted with expenditures, means 5–6 municipalities. 
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expenditure/revenue ratio. Within own revenues that are determining in terms of the repayment ability, 
the business tax plays an important role. If the revenues originating from the business tax were 
deducted from total revenues, the amount of basic expenditures would exceed 70 per cent of revenues 
in the case of nearly three quarters of the two hundred local governments (typically larger settlements) 
where 90 per cent of the sector-level business tax revenue is realised. As a result, the risks related to 
solvency would increase strongly. Accordingly, any redistribution of the revenues originating from the 
business tax would result in a decline in the solvency of local governments that were considered 
creditworthy earlier. 
Chart 3: Liabilities of local governments and the proportion of those with a high basic 
expenditure/revenue ratio according to types of settlements 
 
Sources: Hungarian State Treasury, the authors’ own calculations. 
Note: Basic expenditures mean the operating costs including the value of instalment due, whereas 
revenues contain all revenues except for the ones related to securities and loans. 
Chart 4: Debt-to-GDP ratio of the local government sector compared to the EU average 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: In countries where the Eurostat differentiates between separate local government and federal 
levels (Germany, Austria, Spain and Belgium), the federal level was not taken into account in the data 
published by us. 
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Although the system of tasks and financing of local governments varies across countries, it is worth 
having a look at the indebtedness of the Hungarian local government sector in an international 
comparison as well. The comparison with the local government sectors of the countries of the 
European Union shows that the domestic local government sector is clearly among the ones that have 
accumulated high deficits, although its debt as a proportion of GDP cannot be considered extreme for 
the time being. Nevertheless, it may be a reason for concern that as a result of the high deficits, debt as 
a proportion of GDP increased from the 1.1 per cent level typical at the beginning of the millennium to 
4.6 per cent by 2010. This also shows that a stricter regulation of the financial management of local 
governments and ensuring adequate financing are necessary. 
2. Risks from the aspect of the banking sector 
Bonds outstanding, which exceed half of the total exposure of local governments, were typically 
issued between 2006 and 2008. As a result of the intense competition among banks, the premium 
levels that evolved were advantageous for local governments. 90 per cent of the Swiss franc based 
bonds, which account for the greater part of bonds outstanding, were issued with a premium between 0 
and 150 basis points above CHF LIBOR. It is worth mentioning that these premium levels are even 
below the premiums of the bonds issued by Swiss local governments, in spite of the fact that in their 
case the risk stemming from the uncovered foreign exchange position does not exist. As deposit and 
lending rate statistics for the local government segment are not available for us, we can only rely on 
the ‘public opinion’ revealed repeatedly during interviews with banks, according to which income 
appears in the local government segment through the cross-selling opportunities. In addition to credit 
and bond products, banks offer a wide range of products to local governments, starting from keeping 
an account to option dealing, which may generate commission income for banks. The typically 3–5-
year principal repayment grace periods of the bonds issued (in a total value of approximately HUF 550 
billion) started to expire at end-2010. Based on our estimates, by end-2011 nearly half of all the bonds 
outstanding will reach the repayment period, and this ratio may even amount to 90 per cent by end-
2013 (Chart 5). Thus, although until now the low interest rate level and the fact that it is tied to a 
variable rate (between mid-2008 and August 2011, the 3-month CHF LIBOR interest rate declined by 
some 2.5 percentage points to a level of 0–0.2 percentage points) offset the effect of the strengthening 
of the Swiss franc on the repayment burden, the starting of principal repayments imposes an increasing 
burden on local governments.  
Calculating with the end-2010 exchange rate, with the start of the principal repayment periods, in 2011 
the repayment burden related to total long-term liabilities may exceed HUF 60 billion. The increase of 
HUF 8 billion in the bond repayment burden plays a determining role in the HUF 10 billion increase in 
the repayment burden compared to 2010. According to our estimate based on forward-looking reports 
of local governments, by 2012–2013 the total repayment obligation may grow to HUF 80 billion. 
Accordingly, the repayment burden related to long-term debt will increase from 0.2 per cent in 2010 to 
0.3 per cent as a proportion of GDP. 
Based on portfolio indicators at the end of the second quarter of 2011, the exposure of banks to local 
governments cannot be considered problematic, although observable changes project an increase in 
risks. Especially the risks related to bonds outstanding have increased. At the end of the second quarter 
of 2011, the proportion of non-performing loans was 1.2 per cent in the case of loans to local 
governments. According to our estimate, at end-June 2011 the 90+ day delinquency rate within total 
bonds outstanding was nearly 3 per cent, which means a gradual increase compared to the level of 2.1 
per cent at end-March 2011. Accordingly, within total local government exposures the ratio of non-
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performing loans reached 2.1 per cent, while the loan loss provision coverage of this stock grew to 14 
per cent, which is below the approximately 40 per cent coverage of the total non-performing bank loan 
portfolio. 
 
Chart 5: Timing of the start of principal repayment within local government bonds outstanding 
 
Source: MNB data. 
The increase in the ratio of the amount of new loan loss provisioning to exposure also points to 
portfolio deterioration. The cost of provisioning as a proportion of total loans outstanding increased 
from the level of around 0 observed until mid-2010 to 1.3 per cent by mid-2011 (Chart 6), and data 
show that the banking sector practically started provisioning for the exposure to local governments 
only from mid-2010 on. The 1.5 per cent level of loan loss provisioning as a proportion of total loans 
outstanding at end-June 2011 is far below the approximately 5 per cent exposure-proportionate amount 
of provisioning for all the credit type (loan-based and debt security-based) receivables of the banking 
sector. Looking ahead, however, we consider it important that banks should apply prudent loan loss 
provisioning methods for the local government exposure, and should keep adequate records of the 
restructured transactions, reflecting the risks related to the exposures. 
The start of restructurings related to the local government segment during 2011 also projects a 
worsening in risk indicators. At end-June 2011, restructured exposure fluctuated around the level of a 
mere 1 per cent. However, demand for restructuring from the borrowers’ side appeared already 
concerning the 3–4 per cent of the portfolio, and based on the data of the Senior Loan Officer Survey 
on Bank Lending Practices3 conducted by the MNB in July 2011, banks expect an around 10 per cent 
restructuring as a proportion of total loans outstanding by end-2011 (Chart 7). According to the survey 
conducted among banks by the Central Bank, from the demand side, i.e. local government side, the 
demands related to restructuring are mainly driven by the decline in revenues, expenditure structure 
problems, unsuccessful investment and exchange rate changes. Meanwhile, the management of 
solvency problems and the smoothing of loan losses are the determining aspects on the side of the 
banks. 
                                                     
3
 http://english.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumentumtar/ENMNB/Penzugyi_stabilitas/hitelezesi_felmeres/mnben-
hitelezesi-felmeres-20110825/Senior_loan_officer_survey_on_bank_lending_practice_2011_Q2.pdf 
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Chart 6: Cost of provisioning in the local government portfolio 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Chart 7: Restructuring expectations in the local government portfolio 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Banks usually apply extension of maturity and temporary complete or partial principal repayment 
moratorium as means of restructuring. Restructurings allow the payment burdens of the local 
governments concerned and their scheduling to be adjusted to a different environment compared to the 
situation expected earlier. At the same time, restructuring allows banks to apply pricing that better 
reflects risk costs and costs of funds. Recently, some local government organisations proposed a 
further general principal repayment moratorium of 1 or 3 years covering all bonds. However, in our 
opinion, due to the uniqueness of local government transactions, the optimum solution may be to treat 
the cases of local governments that have payment difficulties individually. 
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Restructurings indicate that the banking sector is willing to manage the risks related to the local 
government portfolio. However, in addition to willingness, another important issue is whether the 
banking sector is able to manage the payment difficulties that arise. Examining local government 
bonds outstanding that are considered to be the riskiest, the ratio of total local government bonds 
outstanding to the end-June 2011 capital buffer does not significantly exceed 50 per cent. In the event 
that in addition to the already existing loan loss provisions a significant, 10 per cent aggregate loss4 
appeared on the total bonds outstanding, only 7 per cent of the capital buffer of the banks that active in 
the local government segment would be used up, and there would not be any bank where the potential 
loss would exceed half of the buffer available. In line with the concentration of exposure, risks also 
affect the participants of the banking sector in a concentrated manner. Database about relationship with 
banks is available for total bonds outstanding. Based on this, it can be established that in the various 
settlement segments basically the share typical of the total local government exposure is reflected. The 
related risks may be increased by the approximately HUF 200 billion exposure to local government 
companies found in our survey conducted during the summer of 2011 as well as the financing of PPP 
projects, and manageability may be limited by the culmination of possible other risks. 
It may happen that the risks related to the local government sector will further be increased by the 
derivative transactions concluded by them. We assume that customer payments vis-à-vis the non-
financial sector concluded with those other than non-financial corporations and private persons may 
provide a rough estimate of the derivative positions taken against local governments. Based on end-
June 2011 data, the market value of these positions was around minus HUF 6 billion. This does not 
entail an effect on the profit of the banking sector due to its covered position (the commission revenue 
related to transactions means income), but it may mean a potential profit for the local government 
segment. Information that allows the analysis of these derivatives has been available since early 2010. 
It can be established that compared to 2010 Q1 there has not been any material change in the market 
value of these positions, but there has been a decline in the contract value of transactions, which 
indicates some kind of adjustment. The number of partners has remained between 60–70. 
3. Regulatory issues5 
In addition to the risks accumulated to date in connection with the debt of local governments, the 
future situation of local governments may significantly be influenced by the restructuring of the whole 
system. Together with a narrowing of the basic tasks and the assignment of important institutions to 
the central government it may arise that together with the reorganising of the tasks of certain local 
government segments (local governments of counties) their debt are to also be assumed by the state, 
resulting in a clear picture. It is important to emphasise that by this step government debt would not 
increase, as the debt of local governments is a part of government debt at present as well. 
The concept of the government published in May 2011 raises several possibilities, including the 
central management of local government debt, the reorganisation of tasks and a possible moving of the 
current accounts of local governments to the Hungarian State Treasury. Until end of 2011 such a legal 
change were not executed. According to the prevailing regulation and practice, the current accounts of 
local governments are held at credit institutions, and they are allowed to change account-holding credit 
                                                     
4
 This assumption means that 20 per cent of the local governments involved in the total bonds outstanding would 
get into trouble, and a 50 per cent loss would develop on each of them. 
5
 As the cut-off date for the overall research was August 2011, we do not analyse in more details the news law on 
local governments of Hungary accepted at the end of 2011. However this does not imply irrelevance of our 
analysis. 
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institutions only as of the first day of each month. Moreover, the Hungarian State Treasury has to be 
notified of the change in writing 30 days in advance.6 The transfer of account-holding to the 
Hungarian State Treasury would result in lost revenues for banks, and at the same time it would be a 
credit risk increasing factor, which may be reflected in an increase in financing costs. However, in the 
case of a change like this, the more recent information base regarding the financial situation of the 
local government sector as a whole would be available in a more up-to-date manner and the increased 
possibility of controlling financial management would entail an important advantage from a national 
economy aspect. 
From the aspect of financial stability it is important that repayment by local governments should 
remain an acknowledged obligation, and, looking ahead, local government borrowing constraints 
move in the direction of ‘effectiveness’. This latter is especially important because the current debt 
constraints are too loose, and thus they are not effective at system level. According to our estimate, the 
statutory borrowing limit may effectively arise at 8 per cent of the approximately 3,200 local 
governments, whereas this ratio is a mere 3 per cent as a proportion of own income. Reacting to the 
significant foreign exchange based exposure it may be worth considering that impose limits to foreign 
exchange based indebtedness, in order to prevent the development of future risks. It is a positive shift 
that pursuant to the change in legislation effective as of early 2011, if a local government borrows with 
a maturity of over one year or issues bonds, the body of representatives is obliged to entrust an auditor 
in advance, and the auditor is obliged to let the body of representatives know about his professional 
opinion on the planned assumption of an obligation. The body of representatives is obliged to inform 
the financial institution providing the financial service about the opinion of the accountant. 
The amendment to the Constitution also created a possibility of strengthening the central control over 
borrowing: ‘An Act may define conditions for, or the Government’s consent to, any borrowing to a 
statutory extent or to any other commitment of local governments with the aim of preserving their 
budget balance.’ (The Constitution of Hungary effective as of 1 January 2012). The intention of a 
stronger control of borrowing also appears in connection with the local government concept discussed 
by the Government in August 2011. The Law on economic stability of Hungary (Act CXCIV of 2011) 
accepted at the end of 2011 defined limits stricter than earlier and central government controls on 
newly disbursed indebtedness by local governments, which might be a significant step to direct 
Hungarian local government system from a quasi market based system to a control/rule based system. 
The procedures that help in arranging situations related to insolvency are of key importance from the 
aspect of credit risks. It is important to emphasise that there is no state guarantee on local government 
debt, and in the event of any payment problems, liabilities may be settled in a debt settlement 
procedure. Nevertheless, in the current turbulent environment the uncertainties related to local 
governments’ ability and willingness to pay may add to the sensitivity to risk related to the Hungarian 
sovereign as well. 
The settlement of local government debt is regulated in Act XXV of 1996, which sets up a clear 
framework for cases of insolvency and can be considered a good statutory regulation even in 
international comparison. The purpose of the act is that bankruptcy proceedings provide for the 
restoration of the solvency of local governments, in addition to performing their mandatory duties and 
satisfying creditor claims in proportion to the disposable assets. The debt settlement procedure of local 
                                                     
6
 It is worth mentioning that the Heves County Local Government, which is under debt settlement proceedings, 
took over its current account to the Hungarian State Treasury, which reduces the chances of intervention of the 
credit institutions concerned (mainly those of the OTP Bank). The prompt timing of the step taken by the Heves 
County Local Government raises the issue of conflict with the prevailing Hungarian legislation. 
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governments is different from the corporate bankruptcy law procedure due to two main reasons: firstly, 
because local governments have to provide the basic public services during the debt settlement 
procedure as well; secondly, because the available collateral is special. Prior to 2010, debt settlement 
procedures usually started in the case of smaller local governments, but during 2010 already in the 
case of larger local governments as well (Szigetvár, Esztergom; and Heves County in 2011).  
In the summer of 2011, to some extent independently of the restructuring of the local government 
system as a whole, local government debt settlement procedures were changed. Within that, the 
definition of the assets that may be involved in the debt settlement remained unchanged, but the 
legislation gives a more precise definition of the elements that cannot be involved in the debt 
settlement (Table 1). Accordingly, the scope of collateral that can be involved in the debt settlement is 
practically narrowed to assets that do not serve the purpose of public tasks or the ones not yet secured 
for the purpose of another institution. 
Table 1: Change in the scope of assets that cannot be involved in local government debt 
procedures 
Assets excluded from debt settlement (before the 
change in July 2011) 
Assets excluded from debt settlement (after the 
change in July 2011) 
residential real estates and other real estates that 
were transferred from state ownership to local 
government ownership 
residential real estates and other real estates that 
were transferred from state ownership to local 
government ownership 
 
assets for which the state provides support and 
contribution 
 
assets of local government partnerships and local 
minority self-government(s) appearing in the 
budget of the local government 
 
the own fund and support parts of development and 
operating resources won by the local government or 
its budgetary body through an application 
exclusively for a given purpose, related to the 
performance of a mandatory task stipulated by law 
 
separately managed sum allocated to the local 
government in order to settle the ownership 
situation of church-owned real estate 
Source: authors’s own construction 
At the same time, the amendment to the law also defined the revenue that can be involved in debt 
settlement (the amount of own revenues collected in the given year or outstanding as receivables as 
well as the revenue from assigned central taxes, from the launching of the debt settlement procedure 
until the recovery of the declared creditor claims). The so-called reorganisation loan was defined, 
which may help in the repayment of earlier outstanding debt with interest subsidy that can be provided 
with a ministerial decision. In addition, the scope of mandatory tasks that have to be performed during 
debt settlement as well was narrowed by certain social benefits and expanded with certain tasks. 
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Based on the amendment, the power of the mayor is narrowed during the whole procedure, while the 
power of the bodies of representatives has increased, which may facilitate the adoption of measures 
related to the debt settlement. The amendment to the regulation allows the restructuring of budgetary 
bodies and public education institutions belonging to local governments during the debt settlement 
even with immediate effect, contrary to the rules regarding normal operation.7 
Overall, from the aspect of banks the inclusion of the experience of earlier debt settlement procedures 
in the regulation is a favourable development. The narrowing of the scope of collateral that may be 
involved in debt settlement could be a problem, but the use of significant real estate collateral behind 
local government exposures was not typical earlier either (only a mere 4 per cent of the total debt 
outstanding is covered by real estate), and the magnitude of other collateral (mainly guarantee) is 
nearly 11 per cent as a proportion of the total debt outstanding. The practice of the request of collateral 
is in line with the already mentioned assumption presented in the article by Homolya and Szigel 
(2008) that banks base their financing decisions on the continuous operation of local governments. 
Namely, in spite of the uncertainties explored, credit institutions are not afraid of suffering significant 
losses on their local government portfolios because local governments cannot be liquidated even in the 
case of a bankruptcy, and their sources of revenue may not dry out completely either. Also, credit 
institutions expect the insolvent institutions to meet their obligations sooner or later anyway, even 
without state intervention, by rescheduling the loans and restraining their expenditures, using their 
own revenues. Looking ahead, however, the increasing risks in the local government segment point to 
the remaining of the strict lending conditions. 
4. Summary 
Until 2011, the repayment of the bonds subscribed during the bond issue boom experienced in the 
local government sector in 2007–2008 started only in the case of one third of the bonds 
outstanding.However, by the end of the year nearly 50 per cent and by end-2013 90 per cent of total 
bonds outstanding will reach the repayment period. As a result of the significant exchange rate 
exposure, the declining revenues of local governments and the deteriorating economic prospects, 
solvency problems may arise. Appropriate management of the risks related to the portfolio is 
important from the aspect of the undisturbed operation of the financial system; at the same time, the 
opinion formed of the Hungarian state abroad may also be negatively influenced by the risks related to 
the local government sector. Our analysis suggests that the banking sector is willing and able to 
manage these risks. Looking ahead, however, from this aspect the future comprehensive restructuring 
of the local government sector as a whole by the Government may be essential. 
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7
 For example, normally it has to be decided before the end of May whether the operating right of a school will 
be transferred to another organisation or not. 
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